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Enhanced Protections For Geographical
Indications Under TRIPs:
Potential Conflicts Under the U.S.
Constitutional and Statutory Regimes
David Snyder*
INTRODUCTION
In the controversy over intellectual property protections for
geographical indications, a rose by any other name would not
smell as sweet. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”) defines geographical
indications as “indications which identify a good as originating in
the territory of a [signatory nation], or a region or locality in that
territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic
of the good is essentially attributable to its geographic origin.”1
Although TRIPs provides protections for geographical indications,
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2821. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
*
J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2009; B.A. History, University
of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Professors Susan Scafidi and Miriam Salholz for
their tireless guidance and inspiration. I am also indebted to the members of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office and the Office of the United States Trade
Representative, who provided me with invaluable insights on this topic. Finally, I thank
my family for everything, and the staff of the Journal for their support. All mistakes are
my own.
1
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 321 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs].

1297

SNYDER_042808_FINAL

1298

5/5/2008 12:33:08 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 18

such as “ROQUEFORT” or “COGNAC,” the recent push for
enhanced protections, spearheaded by the European Union, is
strongly opposed by the “New World.”2 Opponents are concerned
that the European Union’s proposal to re-appropriate terms such as
“Feta,” “Parmesan,” “Mozzarella,” and “Champagne,” which have
arguably become generic in the U.S., will adversely affect business
and trade.3 However, in addition to these pragmatic concerns,
effective implementation of the European proposal in the U.S. may
be undermined by constitutional and statutory restrictions.4
This Note discusses the potential impediments to the
implementation of an enhanced TRIPs Agreement, and discusses
one possible compromise solution. Part I of this Note provides a
background discussion on geographical indications, the TRIPs
Agreement, and opposition surrounding the European Union’s
proposal. Part II analyzes U.S. domestic trademark law under the
Lanham Act and judicial precedent, and discusses the ways in
which geographical indications have been protected therein. Part
III notes the main sources of conflict against which an enhanced
TRIPs Agreement may founder: the First Amendment, and the
statutory scheme under the Lanham Act. Finally, Part IV
discusses, first, one possible compromise, in which the Europeans
relinquish their designs to “propertize” generic terms in favor of a
regulatory scheme, and second, the practical and political
impediments that would remain in either scenario.

2

2 THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
14:19 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing legislative changes which will prohibit new uses of
semi-generic names on non-European wines) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS].
3
United States Department of Agriculture, WTO: Beyond the Agreement on
Agriculture (Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/WTO/geoindications.htm
[hereinafter WTO Agriculture]; see also Albrecht Conrad, The Protection of
Geographical Indications in the TRIPS Agreement, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 11, 18–19
(1996).
4
See Conrad, supra note 3, at 20–21.
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I. GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS & THE
INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE
A. The TRIPs Framework
Prior to TRIPs, various multilateral agreements provided
differing guidelines for intellectual property protections.5 The
1994 conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade saw the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement,
which aimed to harmonize then-existing intellectual property
systems.6 Non-discrimination served as the first policy basis of
TRIPs; nations agreed to treat foreigners and nationals equally, and
pledged to offer equal treatment for nationals of all WTO trading
partners.7 TRIPs’ second policy undercurrent was the belief that
greater intellectual property protections would allow for increased
technological innovation, resulting in economic and social benefits
to producers and consumers alike.8 In furtherance of this policy,
TRIPs mandated that its signatories amend their domestic legal
regimes in order to provide certain minimum levels of intellectual
property protections.9 These protections covered copyrights,
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents,
layout designs of integrated circuits and trade secrets.10 TRIPs
also required its signatories to ensure the availability of
enforcement procedures “so as to permit effective action against
any act of infringement of intellectual property rights . . . including
expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which

5
A lengthy discussion of these agreements is out of the scope of this Note. However,
these agreements include the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583; the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations
of Origin and their International Registration, Oct. 31, 1958, 923 U.N.T.S. 205; and the
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891,
828 U.N.T.S. 389.
6
DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL
BUSINESS PROBLEMS 383 (3d ed. 2003).
7
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Agreements—Intellectual
Property: Protection and Enforcement, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/agrm7_e.htm.
8
Id.
9
VAGTS ET AL., supra note 6, at 383.
10
See TRIPs, supra note 1.
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constitute a deterrent to further infringements.”11 Trade-related
disagreements between TRIPs signatory nations would be resolved
under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, a legal text that
outlines WTO settlement dispute procedures.12
B. Geographical Indications Under TRIPs
Articles 22, 23 and 24 of the TRIPs Agreement endeavor to
protect geographical indications from (1) the use of false or
misleading indications; (2) the registration of geographical
indications as trademarks; and (3) “genericide,” or the dilution of
geographical indications into generic terms.13 Under Article 22,
signatories must provide the legal means to protect consumers
from the misleading use of geographical indications.14 Moreover,
signatories are obligated to “refuse or invalidate the registration of
a trademark which contains or consists of a geographical indication
with respect to goods not originating in the territory indicated, if
use of the indication . . . is of such a nature as to mislead the public
as to the true place of origin.”15 Although Article 22 grants
signatories discretion to implement methods of enforcement for
geographical indication protections, TRIPs mandates that, at
minimum, enforcement procedures be “available” in each
signatory nation so as to permit effective action against any act of
infringement.16
Article 23 of TRIPs imposes heightened levels of protection for
geographical indications for wines and spirits.17 Under this
Article, member nations must “provide the legal means” for parties
to prevent the use of inexact or misidentified geographical

11

Id. art. 41.
See World Trade Organization, Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/about_e/19dis_e.htm.
13
See Conrad, supra note 3, at 45.
14
TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(1).
15
Id. art. 22(3).
16
Id. art. 41(1).
17
See id. art. 23(1) (“Each member shall provide the legal means for interested parties
to prevent use of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines not originating in
the place indicated by the geographical indication in question or identifying spirits for
spirits not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication in question.”).
12
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indications for wines and spirits.18 This regulation applies even
where the true origin of the goods is indicated, or the geographical
indication is used in translation, or accompanied by expressions
such as “kind,” “type,” “style,” or “imitation.”19 Thus, unlike
Article 22, Article 23 protects geographical indications for wines
and spirits regardless of whether their proffered use would actually
result in consumer confusion. In order to facilitate the continued
protection of geographical indications for wines and spirits, Article
23 calls for future negotiations and the establishment of a
multilateral system of notification and registration.20
Article 24 establishes significant limitations and exceptions to
the protections codified in Articles 22 and 23. For example,
Article 24 grandfathers in certain preexisting usages of
geographical indications that would otherwise violate the TRIPs
Agreement.21 Signatories are not required to prevent the use of
another member’s geographical indication, where the usage at
issue has been in a continuous manner for like products, or in good
faith, for at least ten years prior to the signing of TRIPs.22
Moreover, Article 24 emphasizes that signatories need not protect
geographical indications with respect to products for which the
indication is “identical with the term customary in common
language as the common name for such goods or services in the
territory of that Member.”23 Thus, U.S. producers could use a
geographical indication that is protected in France, so long as that
indication is generic in the U.S.24 Specific examples include
SWISS and CHEDDAR cheeses, SWEDISH meatballs, PEKING
duck, and HAMBURGER meat patties.25 Finally, Article 24 notes
that members are not required to protect geographical indications
that have ceased to be protected in the country of origin, or which
have fallen into disuse there.26
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id.
Id.
Id. art. 23(4).
Id. art. 24(4).
Id.
Id. art. 24(6).
Conrad, supra note 3, at 40.
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 14:19.
TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 24(9).
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C. The Road Ahead
On first glance, the geographical indication provisions of the
TRIPs Agreement appear to signify landmark international accord
on the issue of protection of geographical locations. However,
many TRIPs signatories remained dissatisfied with current
protections, and argued for both the creation of a multilateral
register for wines and spirits, as well as extending the higher level
of protections associated with wines and spirits to all products.27
The latter proposal is the focus of the following discussion.
TRIPs members in favor of extending protections, and those
opposed to them, fell roughly into an Old World-New World
divide.28 By 2003, the European Union and others29 called for
terminating the use of certain generic names for food, wine and
spirits unless the products at issue actually came from the regions
identified.30 The European Union and its allies view enhanced
geographical indication protection as a means to prevent other
countries from “usurping” their appellations of origin, as well as a
path to improved product marketing.31 During the 2003 WTO
meeting in Cancun, Mexico, the European Union requested that
over forty product terms containing ostensibly generic
geographical indications be protected.32 Products affected by this
“claw back” proposal would not be saleable, even if such products
did not actually mislead consumers as to product origin.33

27

World Trade Organization, TRIPS: Geographical Indications—Background and the
Current Situation (Nov. 21, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_
background_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Background].
28
Id.
29
These countries include Bulgaria, Guinea, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar,
Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia and
Turkey. See WTO Agriculture, supra note 3.
30
Id.
31
WTO Background, supra note 27.
32
See WTO Agriculture, supra note 3. Product terms, which contain ostensibly generic
geographical indications, include Beaujolais, Bordeaux, Chablis, Champagne, Chianti,
Asiago, Feta, Fontina, Mozzarella di Bufala Campagna, Prosciutto di Parma, and
Roquefort. Id.
33
Id.
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Although the Cancun negotiations collapsed,34 the European
Union renewed its efforts to achieve heightened protections in its
2005 Proposal.35 This Proposal remains consistent with the 2003
plan; it seeks to extend the regime of protection currently available
for wines and spirits to geographical indications on all products.36
However, the 2005 Proposal also contains a “grandfather”
provision that would exempt from the “claw back”37 those
producers who have used a geographical indication in a continuous
manner with regard to the same or related goods either for at least
ten years preceding the date of the amendment, or in good faith
preceding that date.38
Those who oppose the 2005 Proposal are led by the United
States,39 and contend that the existing level of protection for
geographical indications in Article 22 remains adequate.40 These
opponents are concerned that any enhanced protection would
burden and disrupt legitimate business practices.41 As the thenDeputy Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office noted,
the European Union
34

See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Statement of 14 September 2003,
WT/MIN(03)/20 (2003) (stating that although considerable progress has been made at the
Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, “more work needs to be done in some key areas
to enable us to proceed towards the conclusion of the negotiations in fulfillment of the
commitments we took at Doha.”).
35
World Trade Organization, General Council, Trade Negotiations Committee,
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Special Session,
Geographical Indications—Communication from the European Communities,
WT/GC/W/547, TN/C/W/26, TN/IP/W/11 (July 14, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Proposal].
36
Id.
37
Jon W. Dudas, Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and
Deputy Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Statement Before the
Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives (July 22, 2003), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/stratplan2003apr03.htm
[hereinafter
Dudas].
38
Id.
39
Other countries include Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, New Zealand,
Panama, Paraguay, the Philippines, and Chinese Taipei. See WTO Agriculture, supra
note 3.
40
Id.
41
General Council Trade Negotiations Committee, Note by the Secretariat: Issues
Related to the Extension of the Protection of Geographical Indications Provided for in
Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement to Products Other Than Wines and Spirits, ¶53,
WT/GC/W/546 (May 18, 2005) [hereinafter Issues Report].

SNYDER_042808_FINAL

1304

5/5/2008 12:33:08 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 18

is asking the U.S. Government, U.S. producers, and
U.S. consumers to subsidize EU producers through
this ‘claw back’ of generic terms so that EU
producers can charge monopoly prices for their
products. . . . We see no basis for our producers,
trademark owners, and consumers to be asked to
stop the use of generic terms.42
Moreover, opponents of the 2005 Proposal reject the
accusation that their nationals have “usurped” protected marks.
Indications of origin have often been used in other countries not
because users sought to “free-ride,” but rather, because citizens of
the first country had emigrated to the second, and used the same
terms for their products that they had used in their countries of
origin.43
II. U.S. DOMESTIC LAW
In addition to the foregoing pragmatic concerns, statutory and
constitutional hurdles may prevent the 2005 Proposal from
attaining absolute operation in the U.S. Part II provides the
foundation for this conclusion. Specifically, Part II discusses the
U.S. trademark law system, which governs geographical
indications in the U.S.
A. Background on U.S. Trademark Law
Trademark law, a subcategory of intellectual property law,
generally permits sellers to market their items in distinctive
manners so as to distinguish such items from those of
competitors.44 United States trademark legislation is founded on
policy concerns for consumer protection, property rights and
economic efficiency.45 For example, the purchasing public has an
interest in being safeguarded from the deceptive practices of
sellers.46 In turn, sellers have the right to enjoy the fruits of their
42
43
44
45
46

Dudas, supra note 37.
Issues Report, supra note 41, at 15.
VAGTS ET AL., supra note 6, at 381.
See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 2:1.
See id.
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marks, which may carry connotations of good will and
reputation.47 In a world without trademark protections, sellers
would have no incentive to invest in quality control or similar
activities necessary to establish strong brand names.48 As a result,
consumers’ transaction costs in terms of making informed
purchasing decisions would rise dramatically.49 Thus, trademarks
not only protect the producer’s investment, they also protect the
consumer from deceptive and inefficient50 trade practices.51
The foregoing policies were codified in the Lanham Act of
1946 (“Act”), which proscribes activities such as trademark
infringement, trademark dilution, and false advertising.52 The Act
first provides for the creation of quasi-property rights in
trademarks, defined as “any word, name, symbol or device, or any
combination thereof . . . used . . . to identify and distinguish . . .
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown.”53 The Act also protects collective and
certification marks.54 Collective marks refer to trademarks that are
47

See id.
Id. § 2:3.
49
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 271 (1988).
50
See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 3:2.
In general, trademarks perform four functions that are deserving of
protection in the courts: (1) To identify one seller’s goods and
distinguish them from goods sold by others; (2) To signify that all
goods bearing the trademark come from or are controlled by a single,
albeit anonymous, source; (3) To signify that all goods bearing the
trademark are of an equal level of quality; and (4) As a prime
instrument in advertising and selling the goods. In addition to these
four functions, it must also be kept in mind that a trademark is also
the objective symbol of the good will that a business has built up.
Without the identification function performed by trademarks, buyers
would have no way of returning to buy products that they have used
and liked. If this consumer satisfaction and preference is labeled
‘good will,’ then a trademark is the symbol by which the world can
identify that good will.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
51
VAGTS ET AL., supra note 6, at 381.
52
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2007).
53
Id. § 1127.
54
Id. § 1054.
48
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used in good faith by members of a cooperative or association in
the ordinary course of commerce.55 Examples of collective marks
include “CPA,” which indicates members of the Society of
Certified Public Accountants, and “REALTOR,” which identifies
real estate professionals as members of an association.56
Certification marks, on the other hand, refer to “any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . used . . . to
certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture,
quality, accuracy, or other characteristic of such person’s goods or
services . . . .”57 The “IDAHO” potatoes mark is one example of a
certification registered in the U.S.58
The Lanham Act currently offers four separate bases for
registration of a mark,59 each of which is prima facie evidence of
the mark’s validity and ownership.60 Unauthorized use of a valid
mark constitutes the commission of a commercial tort.61 Because
the quasi-property right associated with trademark pertains to the
right to prevent consumer confusion, the trademark itself is not
actually infringed during the commission of such a tort. Rather,
what is infringed is the right of the public to be free from
confusion, and the concomitant right of a trademark owner to
control a product’s reputation.62 Thus, “[a] trademark owner has a

55

Id. § 1127.
See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 2004 WL 763936 (T.T.A.B. Mar.
31, 2004) (holding that the National Association of Realtors, and the name REALTOR,
qualifies as a collective mark under the Lanham Act).
57
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
58
See Idaho Potato Comm’n v. M & M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130, 132 (2d
Cir. 2003).
59
See 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 19:1 (noting that the following
procedures allow for mark registration: (1) use-based application, in which an application
to register is based on prior actual use of the mark in interstate or foreign commerce; (2)
applications filed by qualified foreign firms, in which applicants must state their bona
fide intention to use the mark in the U.S., but need not prove actual use; (3) intent-to-use
applications, which are filed by applicants with bona fide intentions to use the mark on
the goods or services listed, and which require a verified statement and proof that the
mark has been used in commerce; (4) extension under the Madrid Protocol, in which
foreign entities with registration in their home nations can seek to extend that protection
to obtain U.S. registration).
60
LEE BURGUNDER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MANAGING TECHNOLOGY 445 (4th ed. 2007).
61
1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 2:7.
62
Id. § 2:14.
56
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property right only insofar as is necessary to prevent consumer
confusion as to who produced the goods and to facilitate
differentiation of the trademark owner’s goods.”63
Though the Lanham Act appears to authorize a broad scope of
trademark protections, certain marks remain ineligible. For
example, generic words cannot be protected under the Act64
because they merely identify “the genus of which the particular
product is a species.”65 Thus, while the Act precludes the granting
of a privatized right in the term “Apple” to a seller of the edible
fruit, the Act permits the granting of such a right to a seller of
computers.66 Similarly, the Act fails to recognize marks that are
likely “to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive . . . .”67 The common law tort of deceit was the precursor
to this prong of the Act,68 which seeks to protect consumers from
“confusion as to source.”69 Finally, purely descriptive geographic
terms cannot be protected by trademark without the acquisition of
distinctiveness through “secondary meaning.”70 The purpose of a
trademark is to distinguish an individual’s products from those
sold by others in the locality.71 Protecting purely descriptive
geographic names, without more, would not serve this essential
function; such names would merely indicate the locus of
production, rather than serve as a meaningful identification of the
producer.72
B. Geographical Indications and the Lanham Act
Despite precluding the recognition of property rights in purely
descriptive geographic names, the Lanham Act nonetheless permits
63

Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir.
1980).
64
2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 12:1.
65
Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 936 (7th Cir. 1986).
66
2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 12:1.
67
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006).
68
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989).
69
Id. at 165.
70
2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 15:1 (“Secondary meaning requires
only that customers associate the word or symbol with a single, albeit anonymous,
commercial source.”).
71
2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 14:1.
72
See Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 324 (1872).
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protections for geographical indications.73 Property rights for
geographical indications in the U.S. are protected by appellations
of origin for U.S. wine, and regional certification for other
products.74 Under the Lanham Act and the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act, American wine products may indicate a
number of specified appellations of origin.75 The Lanham Act
additionally creates property interests in regional certification
marks.76
For example, sellers may utilize the mark
“ROQUEFORT” to signify that their products have been
manufactured from sheep’s milk, and cured in Roquefort, France,
in accordance with long-established methods and processes.77
Registration78 of indications of regional origin prevents outsiders
from “free-riding” on producers’ designations, and simultaneously
protects consumers from being misled as to product source
information.79
Although geographical indications may thus be protected under
the certification and collective marks doctrine, the Lanham Act
does not permit the creation of exclusive, proprietary rights
therein.
Accordingly, these marks are not owned by the
seller/producer, but are owned by the individual, state, or
association responsible for specifying standards and terms for
licensing use of the mark.80 The Act requires that the mark be
73

See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129. The Lanham Act also permits states to
develop their own geographic indication protection regimes. Though beyond the scope
of this Note, examples include the Florida Citrus Code of 1949, the Georgia Vidalia
Onion Act of 1986 and the Idaho Potato Commission’s regulatory actions.
74
2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 14:1.50.
75
27 C.F.R. § 4.25(a)(1) (2006) (options include the United States; a particular county;
up to three counties in the same state; up to three contiguous states; or a particular grapegrowing “viticultural” region).
76
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
77
Terry E. Holtzman, Tips from the Trademark Examining Operation, 81 TRADEMARK
REP. 180, 181 (1991).
78
An application for certification mark registration must specify the following
elements: (1) the manner in which the mark is used; (2) that the applicant exercises
legitimate control over the mark; (3) that the applicant is not engaged in the production or
marketing of the goods or services at issue; (4) the standards that determine under what
conditions the mark may be used by sellers. See 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra
note 2, § 19:50.
79
Holtzman, supra note 77, at 185.
80
Id. at 184.
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licensed to all sellers whose products or services meet the
certifier’s standards,81 and grants owners and licensees alike the
right to injunctive and monetary relief for infringement.82 Once a
mark falls victim to “genericide,” in which a designation enters the
“linguistic commons,” owners and licensees lose their proprietary
interests in the mark.83 The Act additionally provides that certain
misrepresentations of origin, regardless of whether the mark at
issue is deemed generic, constitute commercial tort sounding in
false designation of origin.84 The following section explores these
two doctrines.
C. Applicable U.S. Case Law
1. The Genericness Inquiry
Because valid trademarks are of substantial value to owners
and licensees, the issue of whether a particular trademark has
become generic is a matter of frequent litigation. The common law
test for genericness, as stated by Judge Learned Hand, has been
codified in the Lanham Act.85 This test examines the factual
circumstances relating to the public’s understanding of a given
mark.86 For example, in holding that “ASPIRIN” had become
generic, Judge Hand asked “[w]hat do the buyers understand by
the word for whose use the parties are contending?”87 Pursuant to
this inquiry, courts must contemplate whether the public thinks that
the mark at issue connotes a generic name of a product, or instead
indicates one source of that product.88
Judicial decisions bearing on the genericness inquiry prove
instructive. In Community of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich,
Inc.,89 the Second Circuit determined that defendant Faehndrich
81

Id. at 183.
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2005); 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2002).
83
2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 12:1.
84
15 U.S.C. § 1125.
85
See 15 U.S.C. § 1064; Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y.
1921).
86
See 15 U.S.C. § 1064.
87
Bayer, 272 F. at 509.
88
See, e.g., 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 12:4.
89
303 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1962).
82
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had not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
consumers understood “ROQUEFORT” as a generic term.90 In
that case, the Community of Roquefort was the holder of a
registered certification mark for its cheese.91 As applied to cheese,
the “ROQUEFORT” mark could only be used to indicate that the
product had been manufactured from sheep’s milk, cured in the
natural caves in Roquefort, France, in accordance with “the
historic methods and usages of production.”92 Though Faehndrich
labeled his product “Imported Roquefort Cheese,” his cheese was
produced in Hungary and Italy.93 In arguing against summary
judgment, Faehndrich contended that a genuine issue existed as to
“whether the term ‘Roquefort’ had acquired principal significance
as a description of blue-mold sheep’s milk, regardless of its origin,
and without reference” to a particular method of production.94 The
court rejected Faehndrich’s contention, which was unsupported by
allegations of facts indicative of genericide.95
The Trademark Board’s 1998 decision in Institut National Des
Appellations d’Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp.96 is significant for
its analysis of alleged genericide with respect to a common law
regional certification mark. At issue in Brown-Forman was
whether the term “COGNAC” constituted a generic name for
brandy.97 Applicant Brown-Forman sought to register the mark
“CANADIAN MIST AND COGNAC” for its beverage product,
which consisted of a mixture of Canadian whiskey and cognac.98
The Institut National Des Appellations d’Origine (“INAO”)
opposed the application on the ground that “COGNAC”
constituted an “appellation of controlled origin” indicative of
designations of geographic origin and quality.99 The INAO argued
that Brown-Forman intended, in contravention of the Lanham Act,
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 498.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 496 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 497.
Id.
47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875 (1998).
See id. at 1883.
Id. at 1877.
Id.
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to appropriate and trade upon the substantial goodwill and
recognition that had accrued in the “COGNAC” term.100
In determining that “COGNAC” qualified as a common law
regional certification mark that had not become generic, the
Trademark Board elaborated on the nature of the required factbased inquiry. Rather than asking whether the public is expressly
aware of the certification function of the mark at issue, the
Trademark Board emphasized that the proper inquiry focuses on
whether the public understands that goods bearing the particular
mark come only from the region named therein.101 Moreover, a
regional certification mark cannot become a generic term as
applied to particular goods unless the mark appears to have lost its
significance as an indication of regional origin for those goods.102
Because the parties agreed, first, that U.S. purchasers primarily
understood the designation “COGNAC” to refer to brandy
originating in the Cognac region of France, and second, that the
INAO in fact controlled and limited use of the designation, the
Trademark Board held that “COGNAC” had not fallen victim to
genericide.103
The case-by-case approach to the genericide inquiry has also
produced decisions that uphold genericness. For example, in the
pre-Lanham Act case of La Republique Francaise v. Saratoga
Vichy Spring Company,104 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
mark “VICHY” could be utilized to denote water even if the
source was not located in or around Vichy, France.105 In that case,
the defendant sold water that originated from Saratoga Springs,
New York, using labels displaying the word “Vichy.”106 In
denying a right to exclusive use of the term, the Court emphasized
that the owners of the spring in France had acquiesced to their
mark’s genericide: “For thirty years the defendant . . . has been
openly and notoriously bottling and selling its waters under the

100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id. at 1877–78.
Id. at 1885.
Id.
Id. at 1885.
191 U.S. 427 (1903).
Id. at 435.
Id.
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name of the ‘Saratoga Vichy’ . . . . [Plaintiff] had allowed the
name to become generic and indicative of the character of the
water.”107 Not only had the mark “VICHY” become generic, but
defendant’s use of the mark was not designed to cause consumer
confusion: there was no attempt by the defendant to simulate the
plaintiff’s label, and defendant only used the “VICHY” mark in
connection with “Saratoga.”108 Accordingly, the Court determined
that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief.109
2. The False Designation of Origin Inquiry
The Lanham Act provides that certain misrepresentations
related to a product’s origin, regardless of genericness, may
Section 1125 of the Act
constitute a commercial tort.110
establishes civil liability for any person who “uses in commerce
any word, term, name, symbol or device, or any false designation
of origin . . . which—(A) is likely to cause confusion . . . or (B) in
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of [a person’s]
goods . . . .”111 Absent indicia of deception, however, a cause of
action under Section 1125 will not lie. For example, in Piazza’s
Seafood World v. Odom, the court determined that a certification
mark containing the word “CAJUN,” along with other symbols and
text, was not infringed by use of the brands “Cajun Boy” and
“Cajun Delight” in relation to seafood products.112 Because the
Lanham Act does not protect a single term that a party “chooses to
cull out of [its certification] mark,” and because the allegedly
infringing marks only utilized one term—“Cajun”—in isolation,
the Act provided no basis for recovery.113 More specifically, the
facts of Odom contained “no element of ‘passing off’ or deceptive
labeling that allows Piazza’s business to prosper by fooling or

107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id. at 436–37.
Id. at 439–40.
Id. at 441.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
Id.
2007 WL 2874436, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 2007).
Id.
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confusing the purchaser as to origin—conduct which would have
taken this case out of the scope of the First Amendment.”114
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY CONFLICTS
Part III describes the potential First Amendment and Lanham
Act-related impediments to absolute U.S. implementation of the
European Union Proposal.
A. Constitutional Impediments to the 2005 Proposal
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the federal treaty
power under Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution is limited
in scope, and cannot authorize actions which the Constitution
otherwise prohibits.115 Accordingly, the First Amendment116
stands as a bulwark against unfettered U.S. acceptance of the 2005
Proposal to amend TRIPs, whose enhanced protections of
geographical indications could impinge on free speech.
Although the First Amendment does not operate as a license
for individuals to “trammel on legally recognized rights in
intellectual property,”117 the Amendment nonetheless protects
certain elements of commercial speech that are applicable to
geographical indications. Since the 1976 case of Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
the Court has recognized a right to commercial speech under the
First Amendment.118 In that case, the Court invalidated a state law
that prohibited the advertising of prescription drug prices.119 The
Court reasoned that, “[a]s to the particular consumer’s interest in
the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as

114

Id.
See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion).
116
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
117
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188
(5th Cir. 1979).
118
425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
119
See generally Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
115
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keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent
political debate.”120
However, in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service
Commission, the Court emphasized that commercial speech is
entitled to a lesser degree of protection than are other forms of
expression.121 The Central Hudson opinion is significant for its
four-part test under which the constitutionality of commercial
speech regulation may be analyzed. First, courts must consider
whether the speech at issue concerns “lawful activity,” and is not
“misleading.”122 Second, courts must ask whether the asserted
government interest in regulating the speech is “substantial.”123
Third, courts must then determine whether the regulation at issue
“directly advances the governmental interest asserted,” and fourth,
whether the regulation “is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.”124 The party seeking to uphold the regulation
carries the burden of justification.125
Government regulation of commercial speech in accordance
with the demands of the 2005 Proposal may not always withstand
scrutiny under the Central Hudson test. The first prong of that test
requires that the speech at issue be “misleading.” Although
proponents of the 2005 Proposal claim that misdescriptive
geographical terms are inherently misleading, U.S. judicial
precedent provides otherwise. Using the name of a country in a
mark does not automatically render that mark geographically
descriptive.126 Instead, courts must consider whether “consumers
would reasonably believe the applicant’s goods are connected with
the geographic location in the mark . . . .”127 A mark is considered
“geographically deceptively misdescriptive” if, first, the mark’s
primary significance is a generally known geographic location; and
second, consumers would reasonably believe the marked goods are
120

Id. at 763.
447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
122
Id. at 566.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983).
126
In re Save Venice N.Y., Inc., 259 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
127
Id.; see also Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom Am., Inc., 287 F.3d 866, 871 (9th
Cir. 2002).
121
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connected with the geographic location in the mark, when in fact,
they are not.128 The proposition seems dubious that the average
U.S. consumer who, for instance, purchases Parmesan cheese, has
any belief that the product originates from Parma, Italy.129 As the
Second Circuit determined in 1925 with respect to the mark
“BUDWEISER”—derived from the Bohemian town of Budweis—
“[w]hatever may have been its original weakness, the mark for
years has acquired a secondary significance, and has indicated the
plaintiff’s product alone.”130 In light of this precedent, government
regulation of geographical indication usage under the 2005
Proposal may sometimes restrict commercial speech that is not
necessarily misleading. Such regulation would not pass muster
under the Central Hudson test, and would, accordingly, be
constitutionally infirm.
Even if the government restriction of commercial speech were
to satisfy the first prong of the Central Hudson analysis, the
restriction may nonetheless fail the second prong, which requires
that the regulation be justified by a “substantial” interest. First, the
government may only assert an interest in consumer protection on
a case-by-case basis; as noted, in many cases consumers are not
misled by geographically misdescriptive marks.131 Second, the
government does not have a substantial interest in protecting
members of the European Union from “harmful” commercial
speech. As Justice Brandeis proclaimed in his now-vindicated
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, more speech, rather
than enforced silence, is the remedy for the expression of alleged
falsehood.132 Finally, an asserted interest in complying with the
terms of TRIPs, should the 2005 Proposal be adopted, would
likewise fail the second prong of the Central Hudson test. Because
the federal treaty power is limited by the four corners of the
128

259 F.3d at 1352.
See, e.g., Peter Gumbel, Food Fight!, TIME, Aug. 31, 2003, at 44 (quoting one
member of the Grocery Manufacturers of America, who noted that “[n]obody picks up
Parmesan cheese in a green can and says, ‘Ah! A fine Italian product.’”).
130
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Budweiser Malt Prods. Corp., 295 F. 306, 309 (2d Cir.
1923).
131
See generally Duncan McIntosh Co. Inc. v. Newport Dunes Marina, 324 F. Supp. 2d
1078, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
132
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
129
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constitutional text,133 the government necessarily can have no
interest in abiding by a treaty during those instances in which the
government’s exercise of power would exceed the Constitution.
B. Statutory Impediments to the 2005 Proposal
The current U.S. statutory regime likewise places limits on the
reach of the 2005 Proposal, should it be implemented. The statute
which enacted the TRIPs Agreement provides that “[n]o provision
of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of
any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is
inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.”134
The statute further emphasizes that “[n]othing in this Act shall be
construed . . . to amend or modify any law of the United States . . .
or . . . to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United
States . . . .”135 Thus, the default “last-in-time” rule136 appears to
be inoperative in this instance of express legislative intent.
Accordingly, any amendment to the TRIPs Agreement that violates
current U.S. law would not be implemented.
The existing U.S. trademark system would thus be controlling
in the event of the ratification and implementation of a conflicting
2005 Proposal. The Lanham Act, which is rooted in trademark law
rather than the law of geographical indications, does not allow for
the protection of generic terms.137 This guidepost would stand in
opposition to the “claw back” agenda of the 2005 Proposal, which
aims to re-appropriate generic terms.138 Moreover, the Lanham Act
provides that prima facie cases alleging false designations of origin
must demonstrate material deception of a substantial segment of
consumers.139 The 2005 Proposal, however, calls for regulation of

133

See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion).
Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994).
135
Id.
136
See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that if a treaty
and statute relate to the same subject, courts must endeavor to construe them so as to give
effect to both; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other).
137
Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 935 (7th Cir. 1986).
138
See WTO Background, supra note 27.
139
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006); see also IQ Prods. Co. v. Penzoil Prods.
Co., 305 F.3d 368, 375 (5th Cir. 2002).
134
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appellations of origin regardless of actual consumer deception.140
These contradictory elements will arguably lead to difficulties of
implementation should the 2005 Proposal be ratified.
IV. FOOD FOR THOUGHT
From a legal, rather than a pragmatic or political perspective,
the fate of the 2005 Proposal will be determined by its collision
with the Lanham Act, and in some cases, with the First
Amendment. As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the 2005
Proposal is fundamentally at odds with the policy underlying the
U.S. trademark regime. The legal viability in the U.S. of any
future claw back proposal thus turns on whether the Europeans
repudiate their designs to appropriate generic terms, such as
Parmesan, which generally do not cause consumer confusion.
Some commentators have suggested that greater comity is
possible even without such repudiation, and have offered the U.S.European Union Wine Pact141 as evidence of a new trend toward
extended geographical indication protection.142 However, the
perception that the Wine Pact is precedent for heightened
geographical indication protection is inaccurate. In December
2006, the U.S. implemented a Wine Pact with the European Union,
which prohibited the use of seventeen semi-generic wine names on
new U.S. labels, while grandfathering such use for existing
trademarked labels.143 The practical effect of the Pact is that U.S.
wine producers are prohibited from marketing and selling in the

140

2005 Proposal, supra note 35 (containing proposed text for art. 22(2) of the TRIPs
Agreement).
141
26 U.S.C. § 5388; see also Agreement Between the United States of America and the
European Community on Trade in Wine, Mar. 10, 2006, available at
http://tcc.export.gov/wcm/groups/tradedataanalysis/@tcc/documents/tradeagreement/euw
ineagreementtext.pdf [hereinafter Wine Pact].
142
See, e.g., Michelle Agdomar, Note, Removing the Greek from Feta and Adding
Korbel to Champagne: The Paradox of Geographical Indications in International Law,
18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 541, 556 (2008).
143
Congress Approves Wine Agreement Bill With Exceptions, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sec.
50, Dec. 15, 2006.
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U.S. new products with labels that include any of the seventeen
semi-generic names, such as Champagne.144
On first glance, the Wine Pact may appear to represent the
“propertizing” of semi-generic terms, and thus to provide a
foundation for the implementation of the 2005 Proposal. However,
the Pact does not purport to create any property right in the
seventeen semi-generic names.145 Instead, the Pact explicitly states
that its provisions shall not be construed as “defining intellectual
property or as obligating the Parties to confer or recognize any
intellectual property rights.”146 Accordingly, the names included
in the Pact “are neither considered, nor excluded from being
considered in the future, geographical indications of the
[European] Community under U.S. law.”147 Rather than creating
any property right in semi-generic terms, which would contravene
the Lanham Act, the Wine Pact merely creates heightened labeling
regulations, which are enforced in the U.S. not under the Lanham
Act, but by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau
(“TTB”).148 In other words, the Wine Pact does not change the
legal status of the semi-generic terms, and does not give the
Europeans any enforcement rights.149 Moreover, the Pact
additionally provides that “[t]his Agreement is without prejudice to
the rights of free speech in the United States under the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution . . . .”150
This First
Amendment savings clause aims to protect comparative

144

See id.; see also Wine Pact, supra note 141, art. 6(1), art. 7(1).
Telephone Interview with Amy Cotton, Attorney-Advisor, Office of International
Relations, United States Patent and Trademark Office (Feb. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Cotton
Interview].
146
Wine Pact, supra note 141, art. 12(4).
147
Id.
148
Cotton Interview, supra note 145; see also Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade
Bureau, Wine Appellations of Origin, http://www.ttb.gov/appellation/index.shtml.
149
Cotton Interview, supra note 145.
150
Wine Pact, supra note 141, art. 12(3).
145
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advertising on wine labels,151 so long as the label passes scrutiny
under the Central Hudson test.152
Finally, the Wine Pact should not be viewed as precedent for a
future geographical indication claw back agreement for the simple
reason that the U.S. wine industry consented to label regulation.153
U.S. owners of semi-generic marks in the U.S. wine industry
voluntarily agreed not to seek new uses for the marks in return for
requiring the European Union to allow, under specified conditions,
the use of certain regulated terms on U.S. wine exported to the
EU.154 Then–U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman, who signed
the Pact on behalf of the U.S., noted that, by establishing
predictable conditions for the bilateral wine trade, the Pact “is
clearly a win-win situation for U.S. and EU winemakers. . . .
Winemakers on both sides of the Atlantic have the right to be
proud of how tradition, climate and expertise combine to create
unique tasting experiences . . . . This agreement honors these
differences.”155 The 2005 Proposal thus stands on different ground
than the Wine Pact for two key reasons: first, the 2005 Proposal
seeks to create property rights in generic terms; and second, the
Proposal seeks to preclude geographic indication usage absent
consent by U.S. producers. In sum, the Wine Pact can operate
neither as a model, nor as a foundation, for the solution of the Old
World-New World divide surrounding geographical indication
protections.
From the perspective of U.S. law, then, the viability of any
future claw back agreement will require European compromise.
Specifically, the Europeans must abandon their anti–Lanham Act
designs to obtain property rights in certain generic terms, such as
Parmesan and Feta, which do not cause consumer confusion in the
151
See, e.g., Wine Pact, supra note 141, art. 12(3). For example, the TTB would permit
a sparkling wine label, which reads “Just as good as French Champagne.” See generally
id.
152
Cotton Interview, supra note 145; see also supra notes 121–125 and accompanying
text.
153
Cotton Interview, supra note 145.
154
The United States Mission to the European Union, United States, European Union
Sign Pact on Wine Trade (Mar. 10, 2006), http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?
ID=0B113911-4CF3-4AD2-91DB-6A191AF9F54C.
155
Id.
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U.S. Moreover, absent industry consent, claw back legislation
could implicate the First Amendment (and perhaps the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause).
Even after these concessions, however, a number of practical
and political problems would remain. For instance, should U.S.
producers consent to regulation in exchange for trade concessions,
such as increased market access, new agency regulation and
administration would be required. U.S. taxpayers will likely not be
eager to foot the bill for foodstuff label regulation, when, from
their perspective, the status quo ante functioned properly.
Moreover, because the TRIPs Agreement mandates most-favored
nations treatment under which any advantage given to one trading
party under one of the agreements must be given to all trading
parties under that same agreement,156 claw back regulation would
become unwieldy. On the other hand, should U.S. producers
oppose regulation, policymakers would be imprudent to endorse
any European claw back proposal.
CONCLUSION
The proposed extension of TRIPs protections for geographical
indications leads to a complex controversy. The ramifications of
the 2005 Proposal touch upon not only pragmatic, economic
concerns, but also two touchstones of the U.S. legal system—the
First Amendment and the trademark regime under the Lanham Act.
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the broadest reaches of the
2005 Proposal would be constrained by the Constitution and the
current statutory scheme. Although the future vitality and
legitimacy of TRIPs depend on bona fide attempts to reach
consensus, such consensus cannot be achieved at the expense of
the U.S. legal regime. The Europeans should render their claw
back designs consistent with the policy undercurrents of the
Central Hudson test and the Lanham Act in order to get the U.S. to
the bargaining table. From a systemic perspective, the Old World
and New World may, in the end, only be able to raise their glasses
of Champagne in a toast to the status quo: allowing the Europeans
156

TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 4.
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to apply directly to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for
certification mark approval.

